Kyiv — Zurich — Tallinn — New Delhi. On July 28, 2025, it became known that the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine had registered criminal case No. 42025000000000510 (Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations entry dated June 23, 2025) under Article 111-2, Part 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine — aiding the aggressor state. The person of interest is businessman Oleg Tsyura, a Ukrainian-born entrepreneur who, according to whistleblowers and media investigations, has obtained citizenship in Switzerland and Germany and allegedly built a transit «corridor» for Russian ferrochrome/metallic chromium from the MidUral group — a material used in Russia’s military-industrial complex. The essence of the suspicion lies in the re-export of these materials with a falsified country of origin, rerouted through India and Estonia. The launch of the investigation was reported by Ukrainian investigative journalist Oksana Kotomkina, whose publications prompted the opening of the case. Kotomkina has called on law enforcement agencies in Switzerland, Estonia, and Germany to cooperate with Ukrainian prosecutors. Since the case involves evidence of a large-scale sanctions evasion scheme by Russian companies involved in the arms production chain, we decided to examine the details more closely.
A Route That Changes a Product’s Passport
Let’s imagine a typical shipment of metal. It starts with a Russian producer from the MidUral list. Next, a Swiss intermediary appears — among them, Phoenix Resources AG, linked to Oleg Tsyura. Then comes the Indian importer (media reports name Vardhman Ferro Alloys), and the final point of entry into the EU is Estonia (at the distribution stage, outlets mention MBR Metals OÜ). At every step, the country of origin listed in the documents is easily changed, and the Russian product is «officially» transformed into Indian — now «eligible» for the European market, which is closed to goods from the Russian Federation. Ukrainian investigative publications — particularly those by the head of the anti-corruption watchdog State Watch, Oleksandr Liemenov, and the editor of Conflicts and Laws, Oksana Kotomkina — describe specific 2024 trade routes traceable via commercial customs databases (ImportGenius/52wmb).
Investigative reports lay out the details of this «triangular» scheme: MidUral → Phoenix Resources AG (Switzerland) → Vardhman Ferro Alloys (India) → MBR Metals OÜ (Estonia), after which the now «Indian» product proceeds further toward European consumers. The switch in country of origin is a major compliance red flag — and in the context of war, a potential breach in the wall of sanctions.
Who’s Behind the Raw Material
MidUral is a long-standing player in the Russian chrome and ferroalloy market. Among the group’s listed assets in media reports are «Russkiy Khrom 1915» and the Klyuchevsky Zavod Ferosplavov (Klyuchevsky Ferroalloy Plant) (KZF). What makes this raw material sensitive is the «chrome — ferroalloys — steel» connection: chrome and ferrochrome are used in stainless steel, armor plating, heat-resistant alloys, engine components, and military applications. In other words, MidUral’s revenues are a resource for Russia’s defense industry.
Why This Is Now a Prosecutor’s Job — Not Just a Journalist’s
The publication announcing the launch of the case explains: since June 2025, the matter has been granted criminal status. To move beyond speculation, the investigation requires concrete proof of contractual relationships and payment chains — contracts, invoices, bills of lading, certificates of origin, SWIFT messages, insurance policies. This necessitates international legal assistance and data-sharing with SECO in Switzerland, as well as with customs and financial intelligence units in Estonia and Germany — not to mention cooperation from India. Without this, the «fingerprints» on the paperwork will remain hidden in the shadows.
Oleg Tsyura
Portrait of the Central Figure
Oleg Tsyura is a man with an «international cover story»: according to investigative reports, he is a native of Ukraine who later acquired Swiss and German citizenship. In the publications, he is described as the owner or affiliated party of Swiss-based Phoenix Resources AG. Investigators also link Tsyura to key players in Ukraine’s past privatization sagas — for example, referencing connections to the «orbit» of former State Property Fund chief Dmytro Sennychenko. In the factual timeline presented, Phoenix is described as the pivotal link between MidUral and the Asia-Europe logistics loop. Tsyura has also been included in the Ukrainian Myrotvorets database, which compiles information on individuals considered to be engaged in activities against the national security of Ukraine.
«Grey Logistics»: How It Works in Practice
There are two main points where the shadow game most likely unfolds:
- Transfer in Switzerland: The Russian goods are legally «disconnected» from the original producer and re-registered under a Swiss trader, thereby changing the legal entity in the supply chain.
- The «Intermediate Country»: Importing into India creates the appearance of a new value chain. The goods are then re-exported to Estonia (or directly into the EU) with a different country of origin declared. Open-source publications have documented specific 2024 shipments that first appeared in India and, within weeks or months, surfaced in Estonia as «Indian.»
This is where sovereign investigative tools are essential — cross-checking bills of lading, customs declarations, certificates of origin (C/O), banking messages, and insurance certificates. Ukrainian authorities are making a direct appeal: MLA (mutual legal assistance) requests to Switzerland, Estonia, and Germany, along with cooperation from India, must become a priority.
Why This Matters to Europe
- Sanctions Credibility. If «re-export under another flag» is allowed to function, trust in the EU/US/UK sanctions framework collapses. Companies that follow the rules are placed at a competitive disadvantage, while «grey logistics» reap windfall profits.
- Critical Defense Materials. The European defense industry — like all heavy industry — depends on specialized alloys. Falsifying origin effectively finances Russian exports and prolongs the war effort’s resource stream.
- The Swiss Hub. Switzerland is a global center for raw material trading. Even outside the EU’s direct legal jurisdiction, Swiss regulators (SECO, MROS, FINMA) play a critical role in dismantling these schemes. Ukrainian reporting explicitly highlights this.
What Ukrainian Investigators Are Asking For
The demands come down to teamwork. In addition to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Kyiv, a complete evidentiary base requires:
- SECO (Switzerland): export licenses, due diligence records on traders, supply data, and banking routes;
- Estonian Customs and Financial Intelligence: customs declarations, certificates of origin (C/O), T1/EX forms, and broker reports;
- BAFA/FIU (Germany): payment tracks, insurance policies, KYC/AML checks from banks and insurers;
- India: import declarations from Vardhman Ferro Alloys, along with terms of delivery and re-export.
All of this flows logically from the criminal proceedings and the investigative findings already published.
Sanctions in Practice: A Maturity Test
In three years of war, the EU has adopted dozens of sanctions packages. But effectiveness isn’t measured by quantity — it’s about sealing the cracks, especially where third countries act as «laundromats» for falsified origins. The ferrochrome case is a litmus test: this isn’t oil, gas, or tankers; it’s a smaller but high-volume flow that is easier to «dissolve» in global trade. That’s why legal cooperation between Kyiv, Bern, Tallinn, Berlin, and New Delhi is a test of both speed and political will.
MidUral in Context: The «Chrome Chain»
For years, Russian business media have reported on how Sergey Gilvarg built up the chrome supply chain — from chemical production (Russkiy Khrom 1915) to ferroalloys (KZF). The sale and restructuring of these assets in 2022–2023 didn’t change the core issue: this material remains highly sensitive for metallurgy and military use. This explains why chrome exports became a zone of heightened scrutiny after February 24, 2022.
Positions of the Parties and the Presumption of Innocence
This article presents the media coverage of an ongoing investigation and related journalistic findings. Oleg Tsyura and the companies named have the right to present their defense; final conclusions will be made in court. That said, the fact that the case has been entered into the official criminal register (No. 42025000000000510, dated 23.06.2025), and that Ukrainian authorities have called for international cooperation, makes this a matter of public interest in both Ukraine and the EU.
What Needs to Be Verified — A Checklist for EU/Swiss Investigators and Regulators
- Ownership and Control Chain: the role of Phoenix Resources AG and Tsyura’s personal involvement or control over the trader; beneficiaries, board members, changes to company statutes;
- Contractual Package: agreements between MidUral ↔ Phoenix; Phoenix ↔ Vardhman Ferro Alloys; Vardhman ↔ MBR Metals OÜ; Incoterms, insurance policies and certificates, banking payments (SWIFT MT-series);
- Customs Documentation: C/O (country of origin), bills of lading, MRN/T1/EX forms; cross-verification of dates, ports, and shipping routes;
- Third-Party Data: brokers, logistics companies, insurers, correspondent banks;
- Customs Database Analytics (ImportGenius / 52wmb): comparison of 2024 shipments with altered country-of-origin data;
- Sanctions Compliance: internal KYC/AML procedures of the Swiss trader, assessment of red flags (frequent changes in C/O, routes through «intermediate» jurisdictions, etc.).
This case is not about a single company — nor even about a single trader. It’s about whether Europe and Switzerland can quickly shut down «grey corridors» in the less visible but vital segments of Russian exports. Ukraine has taken its step, opening the case and publicly inviting its partners to cooperate. The next step lies with Bern, Tallinn, Berlin, and New Delhi. The faster the documents, payment chains, and customs data are compiled, the sooner this case may set a precedent — one that will curtail Russia’s war economy in precisely the places where it’s hardest to detect.
Skelet.Org
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